Social scientists studying material living standards commonly analyse data from surveys that measure the income of the same individual at multiple points in time (panel data) e.g. large-scale household panel surveys or panel data collected as part of field experiments. It is well known that respondents to a survey tend to under-report their income, but researchers commonly assume that the amount of under-reporting is stable across waves of a panel. This assumption is critical, as if reporting behaviour changes, then estimates of how material living standards evolve over time would be confounded with the changes in reporting behaviour and give a misleading picture of changes in real living standards. In this paper we provide evidence on how the underreporting of income in a large scale household panel survey (the Understanding Society Survey) changes across waves.
Non-Technical Summary
Social scientists studying material living standards commonly analyse data from surveys that measure the income of the same individual at multiple points in time (panel data) e.g. large-scale household panel surveys or panel data collected as part of field experiments. It is well known that respondents to a survey tend to under-report their income, but researchers commonly assume that the amount of under-reporting is stable across waves of a panel. This assumption is critical, as if reporting behaviour changes, then estimates of how material living standards evolve over time would be confounded with the changes in reporting behaviour and give a misleading picture of changes in real living standards. In this paper we provide evidence on how the underreporting of income in a large scale household panel survey (the Understanding Society Survey) changes across waves.
Our main finding is that repeated interviewing results in better quality income data. The improvements in quality are large and are strongest for unearned income sources (largely pensions and state benefits) and take effect in the initial waves of the panel. Our estimates indicate that the effect of being interviewed for a second time is to increase the mean of reported monthly income by a substantial £142 (8 percent). We find evidence of similar effects in another leading panel survey (British Household Panel Survey) confirming that the findings generalise to at least one other survey.
Using Understanding Society, we show that the reporting improvements have important implications for analysis of the income distribution. They lead to lower estimates of inequality and poverty but also income mobility.
As to why the reporting improvements occur, dependent interviewing (DI) -a common recall device used in household panel surveys that reminds respondents of their reports at an earlier interviewtakes effect only after a first survey interview. We find it can explain approximately one third of the observed increase in reported income. On the remaining two thirds, given the use of the same interviewers, infrastructure and questionnaires at both waves, this points to changes in the reporting behaviour of survey respondents. Indeed, we present evidence suggestive of a reduction in respondent confidentiality concerns following the first interview. This is backed up with an examination of refusal rates on the income variables which fall off most sharply between waves one and two.
If our evidence is interpreted as reducing under-reporting of income, it suggests that income data provided as part of panel surveys offers some quality advantages over that collected from crosssectional surveys deriving both from the use of DI and also through being able to improve respondent cooperation through repeated measurement. Separately, the reporting improvements found for income might be expected to extend to other sensitive areas of data collection, although this is left for future research.
Introduction
An extensive body of work in economics is underpinned by household survey data on incomes.
Recent examples include: Chetty et al. (2017) (Current Population Survey (CPS)), Hoynes, Schanzenbach, and Almond (2016) Banerjee et al. (2015) and Karlan and Zinman (2011) . Government statistics on the income distribution are commonly based on large household surveys, for example, the official US poverty rate is based upon the CPS. Official income statistics may also rely on panel data, where they monitor changes in income over a lifetime. Examples include official statistics of the European Union (European Union Income and Living Conditions survey); and the UK Government (UK Household Longitudinal Study). This paper exploits a natural experiment created by a survey design to study how measurement error in income evolves with repeated interviewing in a panel survey. Previous research has shown that state transfers and self-employment income are under-reported in household surveys (Meyer and Sullivan (2003, 2011); Meyer and Mittag (2015) ; Lynn et al. (2012) ; Brewer, Etheridge, and O'Dea (2017); Hurst, Li, and Pugsley (2014) ), but there is little evidence on whether measurement error is on average stable across waves of a panel. We find that the quality of measured income systematically improves across the early waves of a leading panel survey. This suggests a major benefit of repeated interviewing. On the other hand, estimates of distributional change based on the early waves of the panel will confound true changes with data quality changes and be biased.
Panel experience may affect a given respondent's income report, for a given year, for two reasons. First, panel conditioning (PC) effects may operate where panel participants change their behaviour as a result of being part of the panel. PC improves data quality if it reflects a respondents improved understanding of the questionnaire content or a growing trust in the interviewer or data holders. PC reduces data quality if respondents learn to strategically answer questions with the aim of reducing the interview length. Related, the data will become unrepresentative if survey participation leads to changes in real behaviour (see Crossley et al. (2017) ). Second, dependent interviewing (DI) -a tool that reminds survey respondents of their reports at the previous interview -will lead to differences in data quality between the baseline and subsequent interviews where it takes effect.
Few studies have examined the stability of measurement error in income across waves of a panel. David and Bollinger (2005) find that false negative reporting of US food stamps is highly correlated across wave one and two of the Survey of Income and Program Participation. Das, Toepoel, and van Soest (2011) This allows us to decompose observed data quality changes into shares due to PC and to DI.
Our approach and data offer several further advantages over other studies exploring measurement error in income data that have used small scale administrative data linkage or refreshment samples (eg. Lynn et al. (2012) ; David and Bollinger (2005) ). First, the large sample sizes available mean we can precisely estimate the effects of interest. Second, our data are representative of the Great Britain population (and not subsamples such as the poor or individuals covered by tax records) meaning that we can study how effects vary by representative subgroups of interest such as pensioners, working age groups and families. Third, our analysis covers a comprehensive set of income sources including earnings, investment income, and a total of 39 unearned sources. This enables us to identify precisely which income sources are most sensitive to prior panel participation.
Our main finding is that repeated interviewing improves the quality of income data (in particular unearned income and state transfers) and this occurs across the initial waves of the panel. A second interview, relative to the first, increases reported gross monthly income by £142 or 8 percent and about one third of the difference can be explained by DI, with the other two thirds due to PC. As to why these effects occur, we are able to rule out interviewer and fieldwork agency learning as explanations. Given the stability of the survey infrastructure and questionnaire content, this points to changes in the reporting behaviour of survey respondents.
Indeed, we present evidence showing an upgrade in respondent confidence in the confidentiality of their sensitive data and falls in income refusal rates following a first interview. Separately, we present evidence of similar effects in another leading panel survey (British Household Panel Survey). More generally, the effects might be expected to extend to other sensitive areas of data collection.
On the wider implications of our results, we show that the reporting changes have substantive consequences for analysis of the income distribution. They lead to lower estimates of inequality and poverty but also income mobility.
The paper proceeds as follows: the next section describes the data. Section 3 discusses identification and the results are shown in section 4. Section 5 explores the mechanisms behind the results and section 6 concludes. A supplementary appendix includes additional materials.
Data

UKHLS data
This paper uses data from the UK Household Longitudinal Study (UKHLS) that began in 2009. UKHLS is a large general-purpose social survey. It replaces the former BHPS as the data source for official UK Government statistics on poverty dynamics. We work with the main 'General Population Sample Great Britain' sub-sample, which is representative of the Great
Britain household population at wave one.
The large UKHLS sample requires the fieldwork for each wave to be spread over 24 months.
Households selected to take part in the panel were randomly allocated across the 24 month interview period of wave one. All adult members (aged 16 plus) of the households are interviewed every 12 months. 2 These two features imply an overlap of one year in the fieldwork period of consecutive waves. This overlap is an issue we exploit in identification.
At wave one, interviews were conducted in 24,797 households with 41,586 individuals receiving an interview. As with all household panel surveys, there is an initial drop-off in individual response rates and 75.4 percent of wave one respondents completed an interview at wave two with a further 1.9 percent completing a proxy interview.
Income variables and dependent interviewing
UKHLS includes a detailed set of questions on income. These are collected for each sample member in a face-to-face interview that is conducted by computer-assisted personal interviewing. A list of the income questions used in analysis is included in appendix B. One dimension of data quality is the extent to which respondents refuse to answer a question. In our analysis, we replace item missing values with the standard longitudinal imputes of the data producers. There can be two other types of missing data: missing an individual interview (unit non-response) and missing an individual interview but a proxy answers a shorter questionnaire. The later two are addressed in the methodology section.
3 Respondents meeting certain criteria are automatically prompted with the specific benefit showcards eg. those of retirement age are shown the pensions showcard; the long-term sick are shown the 'disability benefits' showcard.
4 Refusals are counted as 'refusal' + 'don't know' where a 'don't know' could be a polite refusal. 5 The refusal rates rates for 'unearned income and state benefits' are low. For example, refusal rates on the pension showcard for our balanced sample are: 0.007, 0.003, 0.004, 0.003, and 0.004. 
Comparison to a cross-sectional gold standard
Before moving to our main method and results, we look for evidence of data quality changes by comparing the UKHLS income distribution to that from a cross-sectional gold standard.
The gold standard we use is the 'Households Below Average Income' (HBAI) series, which are the data source for official UK statistics on the income distribution. The HBAI data sets are built from a mixture of survey data, from a specialist income survey (the Family Resources Survey), and administrative tax records. The HBAI data undergoes extensive editing and imputation, by the UK Department for Work and Pensions, which is based on their access to administrative records and knowledge of the tax and benefit system. 6 As the HBAI specialises in income measurement and incorporates administrative data and UKHLS is a general purpose survey, HBAI can be considered as a 'gold standard'.
Estimates of selected quantiles of the income distribution from the two sources are shown in figure 2. Focusing on the lower half of the distribution, whilst there is a clear similarity between the estimates the difference between them diminishes across the early waves of the panel. At wave 1 HBAI gives higher estimates of incomes for the 1st, 5th, 10th and 25th percentiles but by wave 3 the differences have notably reduced (in fact UKHLS gives slightly higher estimates by wave 3). Thereafter the differences are small and stable. As the UKHLS estimates gets closer to the HBAI ones across the early waves of the panel, the figure is consistent with improvements in UKHLS data quality as the panel ages. The top half of the panel shows the median, 75th, 95th and 99th percentiles. The estimates line-up remarkably closely.
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Separately, in the main results, we also compare estimates of income sub-components to another gold-standard. We compare UKHLS estimates of benefit receipt to known administrative totals.
In the next section, we use a quasi-experiment induced by the design of UKHLS to understand if PC and DI are responsible for the data quality improvements observed above.
Methodology
We have two randomly allocated groups G = 1, 2. At time t group 2 (the treatment group) is in wave S(t) while group 1, which begins the survey one year later, is in wave S(t) − 1. Let R(S(t)) = 1 indicate that an individual remained in the survey (did not attrit) up to wave S(t), and R(S(t)) = 0 otherwise. Groups 1 and 2 are random samples of the population.
However, group 1 was selected one year later. If the age structure and other characteristics of the population are stable, group 1 will be on average the same as group 2, except that they will be one year younger at any t. Our strategy is to compare income reports of the two groups at time t, conditional on R(S(t)) = 1 (in both groups) and age. So for example, in t=2010, group 2 is in wave 2 and group 1 in wave 1. We compare the income reports of group 2 respondents of a given age to the wave 1 income reports of those group 1 respondents who are of the same age, and who also responded to wave 2 (in 2011).
In our example this comparison is:
7 Estimates of the 99th percentiles are diverging from wave 3 onwards but measurement error is known to be large for the very highest incomes in household surveys (see for example Bricker et al. (2015) ). Notes: The HBAI corresponds to a financial year (April to March) and a UKHLS wave to two calendar years. To account for differences in the fieldwork period of the two sources, we pool two consecutive HBAI data sets when comparing to a single UKHLS wave. All figures are expressed in 2014-15 prices using the bespoke monthly CPI price index used in the official UK income statistics and produced by the Office for National Statistics.
where y 2igt and y 1igt denote reported income at a second and first interview, respectively, and A denotes age. Note that this is equal to:
The initial random selection of groups 1 and 2 from the population, should ensure that the second term is zero at each age. Threats to the internal validity of our design are as follows.
First, as in any random experiment, it could be that the randomization was not implemented correctly. Second, it is possible that the process of panel attrition was different for group 1 and group 2, so that conditioning on R(S = 2) = 1 is differentially selective in the two groups.
This could happen, for example, because group 1 started a year later, when the survey field work agency had acquired additional experience.
We address these possibilities, in the usual way, by checking for covariate balance across the two groups. In addition we further test for differential attrition processes across the two groups by estimating a statistical model of attrition. Further details are given below.
We implement (1), for a given t, through linear regression. The estimating equation is:
where Y i is reported income of individual i (earnings, benefits and unearned income, or investment income), I(g = 2) i an indicator variable taking the value 1 for a group 2 respondent, age i a vector of 1x1 age dummies and i an error term with E[ i |I(g = 2) i , age i ] = 0. β is the causal effect of interest. As covariates are balanced across our groups, including controls in the model is unnecessary, but we nevertheless include them to improve precision. 8 We also estimated models without controls (appendix A1) and the estimates line-up closely with our main results. We report standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity.
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To estimate the reporting effect net of DI, we set to zero any income source for which an individual received a DI reminder and then re-estimate our main coefficient of interest. This works as the DI reminders were triggered only after a respondent did not report a source they received at the previous wave.
Checks on internal validity confirmed covariate balance at wave one.
10 Full results are included in table A1, appendix A. A further check confirmed that attrition is unrelated to the initial group allocation. The check involved estimating an attrition model including a wide range of controls and checking the significance of their interaction with a dummy for being in the treated group. 11 None of the interaction terms were statistically significant.
Results
Differences in reporting between waves 1 and 2
Figure 3 presents estimates of β from equation (3) . The figure shows results from models estimated separately for total: income; benefits and unearned income (social security benefits;
pensions; and other unearned income); earnings; and investment income. For details of the main pension types and social security benefits see table 1.
The causal effect of being interviewed for a second time, relative to a first, is to increase total monthly income by £141.71 or 8 percent. The effect is driven solely by changes in the benefits and unearned income sub-component of income. In particular, the strongest effects occur for social security benefits and pensions (£24.85 (10.9 percent) and £81.24 (28.2 percent)). These numbers imply substantial differences in the quality of reported data across the first two waves of the panel. Failure to account for this reporting improvement would give a highly misleading picture of real income changes over the period.
9 We also tried clustering standard errors at the level of the Primary Sampling Unit but it made little difference to the estimated standard errors.
10 Small but statistically significant differences were observed for the share White (0.9 percentage points), Indian (0.5 percentage points) and living in social housing (1.2 percentage points).
11 The controls are: sex, age, ethnicity, education, relationship status, economic status, health, housing tenure, household size, number of children. Notes: The point estimates presented correspond to β from equation (3) with the full-set of controls. Means from the baseline (wave 1) interview are reported in square brackets. Confidence intervals are calculated using robust standard errors. The controls are dummy variables for (number of categories in parenthesis): sex, age in one year bands, ethnicity (6), highest qualification (6), retired, student, relationship status (5), housing type (4), long-standing illness, household size (16), number of children (11), region (12) and interview month (12). Figure 4 examines the extent to which the reporting changes are due to PC. It presents results from re-estimating equation (3) but setting a reported wave 2 amount to zero where a DI prompt was triggered. The estimates have fallen in size but surprisingly they remain large and statistically significant. For example, the PC effect on total income is to increase reporting by 5.5 percent. Overall the results show that a large share of the reporting improvements seen at the second interview are due to PC and not DI.
We also explored the possibility of heterogenous treatment effects by estimating models for subsamples of: pensioners, working age with children and working age without children.
12 In the interests of space, we only briefly review the results here. The effects are strongest for the pensioner subsample and are concentrated in the 'benefits and unearned income' component of income. The wave 2 effect is to increase reporting of this category by a large 24.1 percent.
Moreover, 73.8 percent of this reported increase is due to PC and not DI. For the 'working age without children' subsample, the effects are weaker in absolute value but are proportionally large. Benefits and unearned income increase by 35.9 percent of the wave 1 mean and 57.5 percent is due to PC and not DI. Finally, for the 'working age with children' subsample, the effects are smaller and statistically significant only for the total effect in 'benefits and unearned income' (7.4 percent of the wave 1 mean). The interested reader can find the full set of results in figures A1-A6, appendix A.
We also explored the extent to which imputation can reduce the data quality differences across waves. Details are provided in section A.2 of appendix A.
An important question is whether the reporting effects for benefits and unearned income are due to changes in reported receipt or the amounts. Table 1 explores this matter by presenting estimates of equation (3) separately for 12 of the most widely received pensions and social security benefits in the data. Columns 1 and 2 refer to receipt, and 3 and 4 to the (conditional) amounts. The odd columns show the total effect (PC + DI), and the even, the PC effects only.
The effect of being interviewed for a second time is to increase the receipt of each of the 12 sources in the table. The effects are statistically significant (excluding income support) figure 3 notes. Sample means for g=1 are reported in square brackets. † The state pension is a part contribution based benefit. It is paid from age 65 for men. For women, it is in the process of being increased from 60 to 65. and the magnitudes are non-trivial. For example, the effect on the state pension 13 is 1.33
percentage points or 5.6 percent of the wave 1 mean. Column (2) shows that much of the reporting increases are attributable to PC (statistically significant PC effects are seen for both disability benefits, two types of pension, and Working Tax Credit). For example, PC increased state pension receipt by nearly 0.4 percentage points or 2.0 percent of the wave 1 mean. 14 We find no evidence of reporting changes in the (conditional) amounts in columns 3. 11/12 of the estimated coefficients are statistically insignificant. Column 4 confirms this finding when estimating the PC effect only.
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The above increases in income reporting are consistent with improvements in data quality, as state transfers are known to be under-reported in household surveys. Table A3 of appendix A presents evidence to support this claim by showing that the wave 2 estimates of benefit receipt are generally closer to known administrative totals, relative to estimates from wave 1.
To look for reporting changes at later interviews, we re-estimate (3) for different t (t=2010 (waves 1 and 2); t=2011 (waves 2 and 3), t=2012 (waves 3 and 4) and t=2013 (waves 4 and 5)). To comment on the implications of our findings, analysis of a short-panel of the early waves will suffer from bias. In contrast, estimates of change based on the full panel will benefit from the quality improvements that derive from repeated measurement. Distributional estimates based on the wave one cross-section will also suffer from under-reporting problems (relative to later cross-sections), but insofar as wave one of a panel is a cross-section, analysis from a similar cross-sectional survey could be expected to suffer from comparable under-reporting.
13 See table 1 notes. 14 The conditional pension amounts are the largest in the table. This explains why even small differences in the reporting of pension receipt can have sizable effects on the income distribution.
15 Our results are in contrast to David and Bollinger (2005) who found that false negative reporting of food stamp receipt in the US Survey of Income and Program Participation was stable across waves. A lack of statistical power in their study could plausibly explain the difference. In the next two subsections we ask if the reporting changes documented here i) might generalise to other surveys and ii) whether they have meaningful economic consequences.
Evidence from the British Household Panel Survey
It is important to know whether the reporting pattern established is a peculiarity of UKHLS or a more general feature of income data collection. We turn to the predecessor of UKHLS -the notably decrease at wave 10. Thereafter, the gaps remain relatively stable.
We find similar reporting improvements for the Northern Ireland refreshment sample. For percentiles 1 and 5, we again observe that, relative to the original sample, the refreshment sample provides lower estimates in wave 11 but by an amount that noticeably decreases at wave 12. Thereafter, the gap between the two estimates is relatively stable. For higher quantiles, there was no obvious reporting improvements in either of the refreshment samples. We also compared trends in BHPS and UKHLS item non-response rates. Both panels show the same pattern of falling refusal rates, the longer the respondents are in the panel. Full details are included in appendix A.4.
Implications for inequality and mobility estimates
This section explores the consequences of the reporting changes for one important economic analysis: inequality and poverty measurement. Analysis of inequality and poverty is typically based on net income rather than gross income. The following is therefore based on the UKHLS derived household net income variable. The variable has been produced by the UKHLS data providers, has been considered reliable and aims to replicate the official HBAI measure. Gini is sensitive to changes in the center of the distribution, whereas, the Aitkinson measure is sensitive to changes in the tails. Columns 1 and 2 shows the estimates for the control and treated group, respectively, while column 3 shows the difference.
We observe statistically significant differences for five of the inequality measures (standard deviation of logs, percentile ratios and the share below the poverty line). Overall, the effect of treatment is to compress the income distribution, relative to the control. We see that treatment reduces the standard deviation of the logs, two of the percentile ratios and the share below the poverty line. However, the 90-50 ratio increases showing the median rising relative to the mean. Overall, the results show that the reporting differences documented in the previous sections lead to meaningful differences in cross-sectional estimates of inequality.
Are the differences in inequality consistent with higher data quality for the treated group?
To explore this we compare our treatment and control group estimates of inequality to those from a gold standard (HBAI). We should expect the estimates of higher quality to more closely match the HBAI ones. The table confirms that when there are significant differences between the estimates from our treatment and control groups, it is the treated group who is closer to the gold standard estimates (column 4). This supports our claim that the observed reporting increases of the previous sections are consistent with reporting improvements.
We also ask whether the observed reporting improvements lead to bias in estimates of income mobility. This is important as while inequality can be monitored using repeated cross-sections, estimates of mobility require repeated measurement. The second half of table 2 explores this by comparing estimates of income mobility between 2010 and 2011 for the treated and control groups. The treated group is being measured for the second and third time, while the control for the first and second time. We find that the treated group had lower exit rates from poverty and lower changes in income (both in levels and in logs) but not in poverty entry rates or in the share that changed income decile. The magnitudes are non-trivial. For example, the treated group shows an exit rate from poverty of 5.6 percentage points (11.59 percent) below the control group. Put together, this section has shown that our findings from the previous sections have substantive consequences for an important type of economic analysis.
To confirm the robustness of our results, we performed a placebo check for the t=2012 year. As reporting changes were confined to the start of the panel, we would not expect to find significant inequality and mobility differences for this placebo check. Results support this and are provided in appendix table A4.
Explaining the panel conditioning effect
In this section we provide evidence on the mechanisms through which PC operates. We group the possible mechanisms as: implementer learning; respondent-interviewer rapport; and respondent learning.
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Implementer learning
Implementers (fieldwork agency, interviewers) accrue experience over the first wave of the panel, raising the possibility that they are better able to elicit responses at the wave 2 interviews. For implementer learning to explain our results, two conditions need to be met, and we consider both to be implausible. First, implementers must benefit from their experience at wave 2 2010 but not at wave 1 2010, even though the two were being collected at the same point in time.
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Second, implementer learning would have to occur beyond the first full year of data collection (when the biggest learning might be expected) as the fieldwork agency already had a full year of field experience (wave 1 2009) before the period of our analysis sample.
16 A seperate possibility is that survey participation leads to behavioural change as in Crossley et al. (2017) . This looks implausible given that in the present paper the main effects are concentrated in pensions, which respondents cannot manipulate in the short-term. 17 We show that there are few differences in the 2010 wave 1 and 2 interviewer experience distributions (table A5, appendix A). to the first year of wave one. We conclude that fieldwork agency learning is unlikely to be responsible for the observed improvements in data quality.
Respondent-interviewer rapport
Respondents and interviewers may establish a rapport during their first interview, which may result in more accurate reporting at the second. This can be tested by estimating the effect of having different interviewers at wave one and two, on a respondents wave 2 income report.
We augmented our main regression specification with a dummy variable for having different interviewers at wave one and two, and its interaction with the wave 2 dummy (differencein-difference model). The 'different interviewer' dummy captures time invariant differences between respondents that changed interviewer or not and the coefficient on the interaction term gives the estimated causal effect of having a different interviewer on wave 2 reported income. Both the 'different interviewer' dummy and its interaction were highly insignificant (full results are included in table A6). This indicates that the rapport interviewers and respondents may have built during the first interviewer played no role in increasing the reporting of income at the second interview. We conclude that the respondent-interviewer rapport cannot explain the observed reporting changes across waves.
Respondent learning
Respondents may have an improved comprehension of the complex interview or have updated their beliefs about the trustworthness of the data holders following a first interview. On the first, we exploit interviewer reports of how well the respondent understood the questions during the interview (on a 5 point scale). On the second, we make use of interviewer reports on whether a respondent was 'suspicious' about the study after the interview (3 point scale) and whether prior to the interview, the household respondent had questions about 'confidentiality' (binary variable). We estimate equation (3) for the 3 interviewer outcomes where we recoded them Estimates of equation 1 with full set of controls (see figure 3 notes) .
Means of the dependent variables are: 0.31, 0.12, 0.18, respectively.
into binary indicators.
18 Full details of the questions and the construction of the interviewer observation variables are provided in appendix B. Table 4 shows the results. We find no evidence that being interviewed for a second time improved respondent understanding of the interview with the effects being small and statistically insignificant. In contrast, we observe that interviewers rated respondents as being less suspicious after the second interview and were also less likely to have confidentiality queries.
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An interpretation of these findings is that the first interview reveals information to respon- Notes: see figure 3 notes. Sample restricted to respondents of state pension age. Notes: see figure 3 notes. Sample restricted to respondents less than state pension age and with children. Notes: see figure 3 notes. Sample restricted to respondents less than state pension age and with children. Notes: see figure 3 notes. Sample restricted to respondents less than state pension age and without children. Notes: see figure 3 notes. Sample restricted to respondents less than state pension age and without children. Notes: Household income is net of taxes, deflated and equivalised using the OECD equivalence scale. The UKHLS household net income measure aims to replicate the HBAI definition and the two differ only in minor deductions. ‡ Households Below Average Income. See the data section and figure 2 notes. † The poverty line follows the standard UK definition and is 60% of median income. Bootstrapped standard errors shown in parentheses (1,000 replications). Significance levels indicated as * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Estimates of equation 1 with full set of controls (see figure 3 notes). 
A2. Effects of imputation
An important question is whether imputation of missing data masks the extent of reporting differences across waves. To explore this issue, we estimate equation (3) for income and its sub-components, where we set to zero any source which has missing income information. In this way, changes in the extent of missingness are not corrected by imputation. Figure A10 presents the estimates (labelled imputes to zero) alongside our main results (labelled standard imputes). Estimates of the effect on total income are stable but this hides offsetting changes within its components. For earnings, the estimated effects with zero imputes are larger relative to those using standard imputes and they have become statistically significant. This implies that imputes produced as standard in most household surveys help in reducing some of the differences due to differential reporting behaviour across the early waves of the panel.
In contrast, for benefits and unearned income, we observe that the effects have slightly fallen in magnitude when using zero values for missing amounts. This results as our main effects for benefits and unearned income are driven by changes in reported receipt, but some of these are now not binding (the ones with a missing amount that is now set to zero).
Overall, the results suggest imputation can work to correct data quality differences across the initial waves. Year
Notes: Balanced panel waves 1-5 Figure A11 shows the 1st, 5th, 10th, 25th and 50th percentiles. For each quantile, the g = 2 sample gives higher estimates of income in both 2010 (waves 1 and 2) and to a lesser extent in 2011 (waves 2 and 3) -but not from 2012 (waves 3 and 4) onwards. This suggests that the data quality improvements from repeated measurement occur early in the lifetime of the panel. Figure A12 repeats the exercise for the upper half of the distribution showing the 50th, 75th, 95th and 99th percentiles. The estimates from the different subsamples line-up remarkably closely and so it would seem that any survey effects are confined to the bottom half of the distribution.
A3. Selected quantiles by year and group
p99 (g=1) Notes: Balanced panel waves 1-5 Figure A13 shows results from the analysis of the BHPS Northern Ireland refreshment sample.
A4. Further evidence from the BHPS
Northern Ireland did not form part of the original BHPS sample and so our 'original' comparison sample consists of respondents living in England, Scotland or Wales. 20 For percentiles 1 and 5, we again observe that, relative to the original sample, the refreshment sample provides lower estimates in wave 11 but by an amount that noticeably decreases at wave 12. Thereafter, the gap between the two estimates is relatively stable. For the higher percentiles, presented, there is no obvious reporting difference and this fact could reflect underlying differences in the composition of incomes. We compare trends in BHPS and UKHLS item non-response rates at the start of each panel.
We focus on earnings from main job and self-employment profit as the questions are identical in both surveys. Figure A14 shows that following wave 1, we see a fall in item non-response rates in both surveys, although the fall appears to be stronger in the UKHLS sample. 21 Between waves one and two the earnings refusal rate fell from 12 to 10 percent and self-employment from 42 to 37 percent in UKHLS and from 10 to 9 percent and 36 to 35 percent in BHPS.
Fitting a linear regression line through the data points confirms the negative trend in both surveys: for earnings the coefficient on the wave trend is -0.41 for BHPS and -0.31 for UKHLS;
and for self-employment for BHPS -0.07 and -1.28 for UKHLS. 21 We observe that the level of non-response is similar in both surveys. The rates are slightly higher in UKHLS. For example, at wave 1 earnings refusal rates are 10 and 12 percent; and self-employment refusal rates are 36 and 42 percent, for BHPS and UKHLS, respectively. Given that the BHPS started in the early 1990's and UKHLS some 18 years later, the differences may reflect the decline in data quality over time that has been observed in numerous surveys and across countries.
Appendix B (Data appendix)
This appendix provides details of the income questions asked in Understanding Society, including details on the use of DI.
B1. Benefits and unearned income module
The showcard of 9 broad payment types lists: Unemployment-related benefits or National A scripting error at wave 1 meant that amounts were not collected for respondents who reported receipt of sources 37-39. The coverage of these sources is small so we deduct them from our income totals following wave 1 to ensure consistency of our totals across waves. 
